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Chapter 1 
Employee Ownership and 
Shared Capitalism: Assessing the 
Experience, Research, and Policy 
Implications 
Edward J. Carberry 
Erasmus University 
One of the most persistent and important, but often ignored, trends 
of contemporary market economies continues to be the ownership of 
firms by their employees. Since the emergence of different experi-
ments with employee ownership in the early 20th century, a consis-
tently growing group of companies and expanding set of institutions 
have opened the door for firms to share the financial returns of eco-
nomic production with broad groups of employees. The growth of 
various forms of "shared capitalism" (a term that I will use interchange-
ably with "employee ownership") has meant that, currently, a little under 
half of all employees in the private sector own stock in the companies 
in which they work or receive cash-based bonuses linked to different 
measures of corporate performance (Freeman, Blasi, and Kruse 2010). 
Although a number of careful academic studies have provided ample 
evidence that shared capitalism holds significant potential for creating 
more productive, stable, and equitable companies, the topic remains 
remarkably absent from policy and popular discussions about the work-
place, employment, compensation and benefits, economic productivity, 
and competitiveness. In fact, employee ownership is often viewed as a 
fringe phenomenon among policy makers, managers, journalists, aca-
demics, and the general public. 
Over the last three decades, however, a large, multidisciplinary 
academic literature has revealed that employee ownership is, in fact, 
a remarkably common phenomenon that can be found in a diverse 
group of firms and industries. This literature also provides persua-
sive evidence that shared capitalism can have significant and positive 
impacts on employee well-being, employee wealth accumulation, firm 
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productivity, and long-term firm stability and growth. Although a com-
mon assumption is that these positive outcomes are the consequence 
of employees being more motivated in their work by owning stock, the 
research consistently suggests that, in order to generate these posi-
tive outcomes, firms and managers need to structure and implement 
shared capitalism in specific ways—namely, by combining employee 
ownership with increased decision-making opportunities for employees 
and other HR practices associated with the high-performance work 
systems model (Appelbaum, Bailey, Berg, and Kalleberg 2000), such 
as extensive training on how firms work and extensive sharing of finan-
cial information. In addition, the literature has also demonstrated that, 
for shared capitalism to produce these positive effects, it needs to be 
offered as an additional reward on top of existing wages and other ben-
efits rather than as a replacement. If implemented under the right con-
ditions, shared capitalism offers a model of economic production based 
on the shared effort of all employees in creating productive, efficient, 
innovative, and stable organizations, as well as shared financial rewards 
for such effort. This model offers a stark alternative to the dominant 
one based on the primacy of short-term shareholder value and the con-
centration of the wealth generated by corporations into the hands of a 
few top managers. 
Although the research on the positive effects of certain forms of 
shared capitalism for employees and firms is fairly conclusive, our under-
standing of the full range of causes, characteristics, and consequences of 
shared capitalism remains underdeveloped, particularly considering the 
persistent growth in the number of firms using shared capitalism, the 
growing sophistication with which firms approach implementing shared 
capitalism, and the emergence of new forms of shared capitalism, such as 
broad-based stock options in the 1990s. Employee ownership is a com-
plex phenomenon that can be and has been fruitfully analyzed from a 
number of different social scientific perspectives. 
This book showcases the diverse state of cutting-edge academic work 
on shared capitalism. More specifically, this book attempts to illuminate a 
representative cross section of current research about shared capitalism, 
enliven academic debates about it, and embolden new research initia-
tives. The works in this volume do not provide a complete picture of the 
current state of employee ownership or research about it, but by showcas-
ing a representative sample of work, they illuminate shared capitalism's 
complexity as an organizational, psychological, sociological, and economic 
phenomenon that requires deep interdisciplinary understanding. 
Another goal of this volume is to demonstrate to broader groups of 
policy makers, shareholder activists, journalists, business intellectuals, 
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economic and social justice activists, and citizens the ongoing relevance 
of shared capitalism and its potential for improving broader social and 
economic outcomes beyond employee well-being and firm productiv-
ity, such as promoting economic growth, innovation, and employment 
stability, as well as addressing the alarming growth in wealth inequal-
ity that has occurred in the last two decades. Although this book and 
its introduction focus primarily on employee ownership in the United 
States and, to a lesser extent, western Europe, it is important to note 
that shared capitalism can be found in all parts of the globe, from broad-
based employee stock options in Korea, to the privatization of formerly 
state-owned industries in eastern Europe, to worker cooperatives in 
Argentina that were created in response to the financial crisis of the 
early 2000s. This diversity provides a rich set of experiences on which 
we can draw to assess the potential offered by shared capitalism and to 
inform policies to encourage it. This volume represents a modest step in 
that direction. 
In this introduction, I briefly describe the historical context and 
current landscape of employee ownership and shared capitalism in the 
United States, drawing on a number of existing studies that have capably 
mapped out this terrain. I then turn to a discussion of the history of aca-
demic research, highlighting what we know and how we know it, as well 
as what we still need to know. This provides a context in which I place 
the current studies featured in this book. I close with a discussion of 
what the rich social scientific literature on shared capitalism means for 
public policy. 
Historical Context and Current Landscape 
This book examines a variety of forms of shared capitalism, including 
worker cooperatives, employee stock ownership plans (ESOPs), 401(k) 
plans, broad-based employee stock option plans, employee stock pur-
chase plans, profit-sharing plans, and gain-sharing plans. Each type of 
plan is characterized by a specific legal structure that defines a mecha-
nism through which employees receive or purchase stock from their 
employers or receive a cash-based bonus. In worker cooperatives, for 
example, each employee usually owns an equal share of the firm and 
makes either a one-time or periodic investment to acquire this share. In 
ESOPs and 401(k) plans, employees receive employer stock in a retire-
ment account. In ESOPs, firms make annual contributions of stock to 
employee accounts. What distinguishes ESOPs from other plans is that 
employees typically do not pay for the stock with their savings or with 
wage concessions; instead, the stock is granted to them. The company's 
grants of stock are made out of company profits or are financed by a 
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loan with federal tax incentives. Furthermore, for firms to receive these 
and other tax benefits associated with ESOPs, all employees must be 
included in the plan, although there are some exceptions. In 401 (k) 
plans, employer stock can be one of many investments in a diversified 
portfolio that employees buy using their savings. In many cases, compa-
nies match employee contributions to 401(k) plans with company stock 
matches. Since 401(k) plans are also tax qualified, all employees must be 
included in the plan. 
There are also plans that provide shorter-term ownership opportu-
nities (although employees can hold onto the shares for as long as they 
wish). Broad-based employee stock option plans (BBSOPs), for example, 
give employees the right to purchase a fixed amount of shares at a fixed 
price for a fixed period of time. Often, employees have to work at a com-
pany for a minimum length of time, usually three to five years, to get the 
right to exercise their stock options (i.e., purchase the shares). Although 
there is no legal definition of a "broad-based" stock option plan (and no 
legal requirements regarding the number and type of employees who 
must receive stock options), the common definition within the academic 
literature is that a broad-based plan is one that grants options to 50% or 
more of a firm's employees. Employee stock purchase plans (ESPPs) 
allow employees to defer part of their salary in order to buy discounted 
stock on specific purchase dates. The law requires that all employees be 
given the opportunity to participate in these plans, although there are 
a few exceptions. Profit-sharing and gain-sharing plans do not provide 
employees with a way to acquire stock directly but instead provide cash 
bonus payments based on corporate profits (in the former) and group-
based performance (in the latter). There is, however, a plan called a 
deferred profit-sharing plan in the United States whereby workers 
receive cash profit sharing and can invest some of it in company stock 
contributed to a retirement plan, such as a 401(k) or a separate profit-
sharing retirement plan. 
In certain plans, such as ESOPs, the law requires that all employees 
participate (although there are some exceptions), while in BBSOPs, 
profit sharing, and gain sharing, management decides which employees 
participate. In ESPPs and 401(k) plans, all employees are eligible (again, 
with some exceptions), but they can choose whether to participate. Dif-
ferent forms of shared capitalism define specific legal rights for employ-
ees regarding treatment under the plan and access to specific types of 
plan information. Some plans also require that employees have a role 
in governance. Worker cooperatives are not legally required to give 
employees a significant role in governance, but since these organizations 
are set up to promote workplace democracy, they are often structured to 
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provide all employees with an equal, and sometimes direct, role in gov-
ernance decisions. In ESOPs in publicly traded firms, employees receive 
the same rights as any shareholder pertaining to stock allocated to their 
accounts, while in ESOPs in privately held firms, a trustee votes the 
shares for employees. Companies can, however, extend full voting rights 
to ESOP participants. In BBSOPs and ESPPs, employees receive vot-
ing rights only if they work for a publicly traded company and hold onto 
their shares after purchase. Most employees in these plans, however, sell 
their shares immediately upon purchase. Since employees do not receive 
stock in cash profit-sharing and gain-sharing plans, there are no legal 
requirements for employees to have any governance role. Beyond these 
fairly limited voting rights in ESOPS, no laws require firms to create 
structures for employee participation in decision making in conjunction 
with the implementation of any form of shared capitalism. In essence, 
therefore, most types of shared capitalist plans are primarily mechanisms 
for employees to acquire a financial stake in their employers, although 
no laws restrict firms from implementing structured ways for employees 
to participate in management or governance. In fact, a growing num-
ber of companies with employee ownership do expand the traditional 
employer-employee relationship by fostering employee participation in 
daily work decisions, broader management of the firm, and corporate 
governance. 
Firms establish different forms of shared capitalism for a variety of 
reasons, such as deep ideological commitments to workplace democracy, 
the desire to provide employees with a short-term financial stake or offer 
competitive benefits as part of a broader human resource strategy, or 
the need to create a market for the shares of owners of firms that are 
not publicly traded. Shared capitalism of many types has existed in the 
United States since the 19th century (Blasi and Kruse 2006). Variations 
on profit sharing and gain sharing, for example, have been in place since 
at least the last century. These plans are flexible and provide straightfor-
ward ways for companies to share the financial benefits of improvements 
in productivity and profitability with employees. Worker cooperatives, 
which most fundamentally alter traditional systems of capitalist owner-
ship and control of the firm, also have a long history in the United States 
(Logue and Yates 2001). They have been most common in specific 
industries (such as service and retail) and smaller firms and are often 
created because of ideological commitments of their founders to eco-
nomic democracy. In addition to the long-term presence of these two 
types of plans, there have been waves of adoption of other types of plans. 
The first significant growth of shared capitalism occurred in the mid- to 
late 19th century in the United States (Blasi, Kruse, and Bernstein 2003) 
6 EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP AND SHARED CAPITALISM 
and then later in the early 20th century within the then-new popula-
tion of large, publicly traded companies (Blasi and Kruse 2006). These 
plans, which included variations on direct ownership and profit sharing, 
as well as employee involvement in governance through works councils, 
were in part created to temper the radicalization of the broad movement 
for workers' rights that emerged in lock step with industrial capitalism 
(Rosen, Case, and Staubus 2005). This wave of diffusion of shared capi-
talism, however, ended with the Depression (Blasi and Kruse 2006). 
Despite subsequent experiments with different forms of welfare cap-
italism (Jacoby 1997) and interest in human relations after the Depres-
sion (Rosen, Case, and Staubus 2005) and the growth in the number of 
worker cooperatives in the 1960s (Jackall and Levin 1984), the next wave 
of significant shared capitalist diffusion did not begin until the mid-
1970s with the passage of the Employee Retirement Income Security 
Act (ERISA) in 1974, which created the legal structure for ESOPs. The 
IRS created the legal structure for 401(k) plans in 1980. The number 
of both plans has grown or held steady with the growing popularity of 
defined contribution retirement plans since the 1980s. Later amend-
ments to ESOP regulations provided more tax benefits for companies 
establishing them and, therefore, made the plans more attractive, par-
ticularly as a mechanism of business continuity in privately held firms. 
Although 401(k) plans provide a way for employees to acquire stock, 
they are predominantly viewed as retirement vehicles and not as a way 
for employees to acquire a significant ownership stake. 
More recently, the rise to prominence of knowledge-based indus-
tries associated with personal computers, the Internet, and biotechnol-
ogy during the 1990s brought with it the diffusion of BBSOPs and, to 
a lesser extent, ESPPs. The growth in these plans mirrored the growth 
of the sector in general, beginning as far back as the 1950s in the semi-
conductor industry (Blasi, Kruse, and Bernstein 2003), continuing in the 
1980s in the personal computer and software industries, and diffusing 
widely in the 1990s with the emergence of a set of new industries related 
to the Internet. BBSOPs were used primarily as a way for start-up firms 
to attract and retain employees while conserving cash, although the shar-
ing of capital ownership also stemmed in part from nontraditional ideas 
about hierarchy and authority among some corporate leaders in these 
sectors (Blasi, Kruse, and Bernstein 2003; Saxenian 1996). By the mid-
1990s, the practice had become institutionalized among high-tech firms 
simply as "the way things are done." This evolution occurred in both 
private and publicly traded companies, and, by the late 1990s, had even 
started to spread to nontech firms. The bursting of the high-tech bubble 
in 2000 and the subsequent corporate scandals that began with the 
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collapse of Enron, however, challenged the legitimacy of stock options 
and brought regulatory changes that negatively affected their accounting 
treatment. Anecdotal evidence suggests that, although private start-ups 
are still using these mechanisms, larger public companies have turned 
away from such plans, largely as a consequence of the changes in the 
accounting treatment of stock options. However, stock options remain a 
common component of executive compensation. 
All of these developments have produced the current landscape of 
shared capitalism, which can be characterized as a diversity of forms in 
a diverse group of companies and industries. There are, however, five 
common manifestations of shared capitalism that can be classified as 
primary types: (1) ESOPS in privately held firms that own a minority of 
stock and function as retirement plans, (2) ESOPs that own a majority of 
stock and combine the plan with significant decision-making opportuni-
ties for employees, (3) small start-ups with BBSOPs and decentralized 
authority structures, (4) public firms in which one or many types of 
shared capitalism are implemented and function similar to shorter term, 
cash-based bonuses, and (5) worker cooperatives, which, by their nature, 
are unique organizational forms. This typology does not cover all firms, 
but it highlights the most common examples. 
Like any organizational phenomenon, gaming an accurate picture of 
the overall incidence of plans is a difficult task due to a lack of available 
data, and, in the particular case of the United States, the regrettable lack 
of a national, longitudinal, representative survey of corporations. Kruse, 
Blasi, and Park (2010) provide the most recent estimates, using data 
from the General Social Survey (GSS) of individuals collected in 2002 
and 2006. The GSS is a nationally representative sample of individuals 
(not organizations), but it asks questions about whether individuals own 
employer stock, have stock options, or participate in profit sharing or 
gain sharing. The most recent data (from 2006) indicated that a little less 
than half of the respondents (47%) participate in some form of shared 
capitalism. About a fifth (18%) own stock in their companies through 
an ESOP, 401(k), or ESPP; 38% participate in a profit-sharing plan, and 
27% in a gain-sharing plan. The GSS does not collect data on worker 
cooperatives. The National Center for Employee Ownership (NCEO) 
provides the most reliable estimates of the number of firms using dif-
ferent types of plans. In early 2010, the NCEO estimates that there 
were approximately 10,500 companies with ESOPs (with 12.7 million 
participants and $900 billion in assets); 800 companies with 401(k) plans 
that are primarily invested in company stock (with 5 million participants 
and $200 million in assets); 3,000 firms with BBSOPs covering 10 mil-
lion employees; and 4,000 firms with ESPPs covering about 11 million 
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employees (NCEO 2010). Finally, there are approximately 300 worker 
cooperatives in the United States covering over 3,500 employees and 
with $400 million in annual revenues (U.S. Federation of Worker Coop-
eratives 2010). 
This section provided an overview of the different forms of shared 
capitalism and their incidence in the U.S. economy. The evidence shows 
that the phenomenon is not limited to specific parts of the economy but 
is present in a number of industries (Freeman, Blasi, and Kruse 2010). 
Since shared capitalism comes in different forms in different types of 
firms, the motivations for the implementation of plans and their effects 
on employees, corporate performance, and broader social and economic 
outcomes are likely to be varied and complex. In the next section, I 
examine the findings from the academic literature regarding the causes 
and consequences of shared capitalism. 
Academic Research on Shared Capitalism 
Academic attention to shared capitalism has waxed and waned in the 
last four decades, mostiy responding to the diffusion of different types 
of plans. Research on cooperatives, for example, began to appear in the 
1970s as a response to a number of trends, including the emergence of 
experiments in worker self-management in the former Yugoslavia, the 
discovery of long-existing co-ops in Western Hemisphere capitalist coun-
tries, and the emergence of a new cohort of cooperatives in the United 
States in the 1960s (e.g., Jackall and Levin 1984; Jones 1977, 1979; Vanek 
1975). Academic studies of ESOPs began to appear in the late 1970s fol-
lowing the creation of the legal structure for ESOPs in 1975 (e.g., Ham-
mer and Stern 1980; Long 1979), and research on BBSOPs emerged 
in the late 1990s following the high-tech boom (e.g., Blasi, Kruse, and 
Bernstein 2003). The primary streams of academic research on shared 
capitalism have focused on the effects of shared capitalism on employees, 
the consequences for firm performance, and the consequences for firm 
stability and employment growth. However, this categorization by no 
means covers all studies on shared capitalism, which has been the focus 
of scholars in a diverse range of disciplines including economics, psychol-
ogy, sociology, industrial and labor relations, human resource manage-
ment (HRM), and organizational behavior. 
Academic work on shared capitalism has employed a diverse range 
of methodologies, analyzing quantitative and qualitative data collected 
through surveys, interviews, ethnographies, case studies, and archival 
data. In this section, I provide a brief overview of the primary findings of 
this research. It is not an exhaustive treatment of the hundreds of studies 
that have been done, but it is intended to provide a high-level overview 
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of three primary research streams. I mainly draw upon a number of com-
prehensive reviews of the literature, including Kruse and Blasi (1997), 
Kruse (2002), Kaarsemaker (2006), and Caramelli (Chapter 7 in this vol-
ume). Also, although research has been conducted on shared capitalism 
in all parts of the world, in this review, I focus chiefly on research on the 
U.S. experience. 
Employee Outcomes 
A common research topic has been the effect of shared capital-
ism on employee outcomes, such as standard employee attitudes in 
organizational psychology (e.g., job satisfaction, organizational commit-
ment, turnover intention, motivation, and company loyalty); economic 
consequences such as wealth acquisition (Buchele, Kruse, Rodgers, 
and Scharf 2010); and sociological outcomes such as class identification 
(Meyers, Chapter 5 in this volume) and inequality (Carberry 2010). In 
his comprehensive review of 31 studies of the impact of shared capital-
ism on employee attitudes and behavior, Kruse (2002) finds that the 
evidence reveals that shared capitalism is usually associated with more 
commitment to and identification with organizations, that most stud-
ies found either a positive or neutral effect of shared capitalism on job 
satisfaction and motivation, and that most employees like being owners. 
Kruse (2002) is careful to note, however, that employee ownership does 
not automatically lead to improvements in attitudes—however, when it 
does, it is not a function of how much stock employees own but of the 
simple fact that they are owners. 
In a similarly exhaustive review of 58 studies examining the relation-
ship between shared capitalism (mostly ESOPs and cooperatives) and 
a range of HRM outcomes (e.g., job satisfaction, organizational com-
mitment, psychological ownership) in different countries, Kaarsemaker 
(2006) found that 38 studies found a clear positive association, 12 found 
no effect, and only 8 studies found direct negative effects. Kaarsemaker 
(2006:36) observes that "although negative effects are relatively rare . . 
. favorable effects do not come about automatically," highlighting that 
managerial commitment to ownership and psychological ownership 
seem to be important moderating variables, as is participation in deci-
sion making, information sharing, and profit sharing. 
Finally, in summarizing an extensive set of studies using a data 
set of over 40,000 employees in 14 companies with shared capitalism, 
Freeman, Blasi, and Kruse (2010:12) find that "shared capitalism is 
associated with greater participation in decision-making, higher pay, 
more job security, more job satisfaction, and better management labor 
practices. These relationships are stronger when shared capitalism is 
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combined with employee involvement and decision-making and with 
other advanced personnel and labor policies." 
Although most of the research on employee outcomes has focused 
on psychological measures, other work has concentrated on socioeco-
nomic outcomes. In reviewing the research on the effect of shared 
capitalism on wages and wealth, Kruse (2002) notes that, in contrast to 
popular beliefs, shared capitalism is usually provided to employees as 
an additional benefit. In a recent study comparing wealth outcomes of 
over 40,000 employees in 14 companies with any form of shared capital-
ism, Buchele, Kruse, Rodgers, and Scharf (2010) found that employees 
accumulate significantly more wealth than employees in companies 
without shared capitalism and that shared capitalism does not come at 
the expense of wages. They also find, however, that the wealth of non-
managers in these firms is only about one third that of managers. These 
results are in line with those found by Carberry (2010) using the same 
sample. That study also found that women and nonwhite workers are, 
on average, less likely to participate in shared capitalism programs and 
acquire significantly lower levels of financial wealth through these plans. 
Although many of these effects were the result of existing mechanisms 
of occupational and educational segregation, there was evidence that 
some plans were structured in ways that appear to systematically exclude 
women and nonwhite employees. Our understanding of the ultimate 
impacts of shared capitalism on broad patterns of economic inequality, 
however, remains very incomplete. 
Corporate Performance 
Another common topic of academic attention has been the effects 
of shared capitalism on corporate performance, and most of this atten-
tion has focused on ESOPs. The first large-scale study on the effect of 
ESOPs on firm performance was done in the mid-1980s by the U.S. 
General Accounting Office (GAO 1987). The findings indicated that 
ESOPs are associated with improvements to performance, but only 
when these plans are combined with employee involvement in job-
level decision making. An early study by Rosen and Quarrey (1987) on 
a different sample of ESOP firms found similar results. Kruse (2002) 
reviewed the existing evidence from 30 studies on shared capitalism 
(mostly ESOPs) and observed that most research has found a positive or 
neutral relationship between shared capitalism and firm performance. 
In terms of ESOPs, productivity improves by an average of 4% to 5% in 
the year of ESOP adoption and continues after adoption. Kruse (2002:6) 
points out that this is "more than twice the annual productivity growth of 
the U.S. economy over the past 20 years." In another exhaustive review, 
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Kaarsemaker (2006) examined 70 studies and found that 48 provided 
evidence of a positive relationship between shared capitalism and cor-
porate performance, while only 6 studies found negative effects and 12 
found no effects. 
Scholars have also examined the effect of profit-sharing plans on 
firm performance. In a rigorous longitudinal analysis of a representative 
sample of U.S. firms with profit-sharing plans, Kruse (1993) found that 
these plans improve firm productivity but only when they are structured 
as cash payouts (vs. payouts made in stock), when payouts are larger, and 
in smaller firms. In their review of the literature, Weitzman and Kruse 
(1995) find that most studies have found a positive connection between 
profit sharing and worker productivity. Our understanding of the con-
nections between profit sharing and performance, however, needs to be 
brought up to date, especially considering the wide incidence of these 
plans in the U.S. economy. There have been fewer studies examin-
ing the impacts of BBSOPs on corporate performance (although the 
number is growing) and none on ESPPs. In a comprehensive review of 
existing work on BBSOPs, Aldatmaz and Ouimet (Chapter 8 in this vol-
ume) conclude that, although many studies find a positive relationship 
between BBSOPs and performance, there is insufficient evidence of a 
causal link or of specific mechanisms that may be driving such a causal 
link. However, existing studies of BBSOPs have suggested some logi-
cal mechanisms that might be driving the performance effect, such as 
the enhanced productivity of individual employees, the ability of firms 
to conserve cash in the start-up phase, and better employee retention, 
which can lead to lower turnover costs (Aldatmaz and Ouimet, Chapter 
8 in this volume). 
Although a number of studies have found evidence of a positive 
effect of ESOPs on performance, there is still a lack of evidence about 
the mechanisms driving performance gains. As Caramelli observes in his 
chapter in this volume, most work on the effect of shared capitalism on 
corporate performance has been theoretically thin. The common wis-
dom is that if employees become owners or receive cash-based bonuses 
based on productivity gains, they will work harder to improve com-
pany performance. However, Blasi (1988) observed that such thinking 
amounts to a "fallacy of performance," that is, getting employees to work 
harder and smarter will not necessarily lead to better firm performance, 
which is contingent on a number of complex factors. In fact, most in-
depth explanations of the shared capitalism-performance link suggested 
by academic researchers have focused on sociological mechanisms, such 
as the reduction of management-labor conflict, and a "collective incen-
tive to improve workplace cooperation, information sharing, and 
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organizational citizenship behavior" (Kruse 2002:6). This observation 
would certainly be in line with the important finding of the GAO study 
(1987) that only when ESOPs are combined with participative decision-
making structures do they improve corporate performance. These types 
of explanations have been echoed by Kaarsemaker (2006:44) in his 
comprehensive review, in which he points out that the existing literature 
provides significant evidence that the performance effects occur only 
in combination with "HRM practices like information-sharing, profit-
sharing, and particularly participation in decision-making." 
Moreover, in a rich set of recent studies based on both the Gen-
eral Social Survey and a unique sample of over 40,000 employees in 14 
companies with shared capitalism, Freeman, Blasi, and Kruse (2010:23) 
observe that "shared capitalism works best when it combines monetary 
incentives with employee decision-making and personnel and labor poli-
cies that empower and encourage employees." Finally, extensive case 
study research by experienced practitioners in the field has offered very 
strong evidence that the combination of financial participation and an 
"ownership culture" drives the long-term success of shared capitalist 
companies (Rosen, Case, and Staubus 2005). A number of firms have 
effectively created such cultures of ownership by combining ownership 
with participation by employees in decision making, extensive informa-
tion sharing about the business, and in-depth training and education 
about ownership and financial literacy (Rosen, Case, and Staubus 2005). 
Despite the persuasive balance of evidence regarding the role of more 
sociological explanations of the connections between employee owner-
ship and corporate performance, we could still benefit from additional 
academic studies that more precisely illuminate the mechanisms driving 
the positive relationship. 
Organizational Stability and Growth 
A smaller number of studies have examined the influence of shared 
capitalism on employment growth, stability, and firm survival. In a large, 
longitudinal study of U.S. public companies, Blair, Kruse, and Blasi 
(2000) found that firms in which employees held more than 17% of 
company stock had more stable employment and that it did not come 
at the expense of efficiency or stock market performance. Furthermore, 
from the beginning of their observation period in 1983, they found that 
ESOP firms were 20% more likely to survive past 1995 than their indus-
try peers. In a survey of a large population of ESOPs in Ohio, Logue 
and Yates (2001) found that firms with ESOPs grew faster than similar 
non-ESOP firms in their industries. In an update of their study using a 
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two groups of ESOPs who survived at least 17 and up to 25 years with 
those who did not survive as long. They found that longer-lasting ESOP 
firms were more likely to use more employee involvement practices, 
provide employees with a voice in governance, and engage in more 
extensive training and communication around business literacy. In addi-
tion, longer-surviving ESOPs were also more fiscally prudent in terms of 
taking on debt and being more willing to make sacrifices in the present 
for survival in the future. Finally, in an analysis of the longevity of the 
famous group of cooperatives founded in Mondragon, Spain, in 1956, 
Arando, Freundlich, Gago, Jones, and Kato (Chapter 9 in this volume) 
demonstrate that this network of co-ops has been able to realize constant 
employment and economic growth in the face of intensive market pres-
sures relating to globalization and ongoing financial shocks. 
What Does the Research Tell Us and What Do We Need to Know? 
In assessing the substantial body of academic research, some well-
supported conclusions can be drawn. Shared capitalism of different 
kinds, when implemented under certain conditions, can have positive 
effects on psychological and economic outcomes of employees at all 
occupational and organizational levels, as well as positive effects on firm 
performance, growth, and long-term stability. However, these gains are 
much more likely to occur when shared capitalism is implemented as a 
way to fundamentally enhance an existing culture based on shared com-
mitment, sacrifice, information, and rewards, or as a way to transform 
more-traditional top-down cultures and authority structures along these 
lines. In short, shared capitalism appears to work well only when it is 
used as a way to promote workplaces that distribute power and authority 
more broadly. 
The effects of shared capitalism on employee outcomes, corporate 
performance, and organizational survival represent only the three largest 
streams of research. Although researchers in a range of disciplines have 
looked at a number of other outcomes, it is beyond the scope of this 
introduction to review them in depth. Despite the impressive progress 
of researchers studying employee ownership, important gaps remain. 
First, we still lack in-depth longitudinal analyses of how shared capital-
ism has influenced long-term trends in income and wealth inequality. 
Despite the potential of shared capitalism to mitigate the dramatic 
increase in economic inequality in the United States since the 1980s, 
there are no academic studies that examine this effect directly. Most 
work studying broader patterns of wealth accumulation has focused 
on how the increased use of executive stock options has concentrated 
wealth at the top, but no studies have examined how shared capitalism 
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writ large has affected the wealth of other groups or altered economic 
inequality (for a notable exception, see Morgan and Cha 2007). 
Second, although we know that systems of participative manage-
ment and ownership cultures seem to unlock the potential of shared 
capitalism, it would be helpful to have more studies that examine these 
connections in more detail and that attempt to discover exactly why this 
combination seems to be so important. What role do individual attitudes 
and behavior play? Do the performance gains emerge from the ways 
in which decentralized decision-making structures capitalize on the 
knowledge and experience of all employees? Is it about the creation of 
a cohesive collectivist culture? While we have extensive case study evi-
dence that the combination of employee ownership and participative 
management is what matters (e.g., Rosen, Case, and Staubus 2005), we 
lack longitudinal, large-N studies testing this finding in a large sample of 
firms. In addition, few studies have examined why more companies that 
implement shared capitalism do not embrace employee participation in 
decision making and employee involvement in governance. 
A third notable gap is the lack of sociological analyses of the diffusion 
of different forms of shared capitalism. Organizational sociologists have 
developed sophisticated tools for analyzing diffusion of a range of orga-
nizational practices (Strang and Soule 1998), but we are missing similar 
studies for shared capitalism, which would help us understand why firms 
adopt shared capitalism and help us identify potential barriers to adop-
tion. It is notable that, despite the apparent benefits of shared capitalism 
for employees, firms, and shareholders, more firms do not adopt such 
plans. Moreover, we know that stock-based compensation has become 
a more common part of executive compensation in the last two decades. 
Why has a similar boom not occurred with broad-based equity compen-
sation plans? 
Finally, two prominent criticisms leveled at employee ownership 
have been that it promotes free riding in the workplace and that it cre-
ates too much financial risk for employees. In a set of recent studies, 
Freeman, Blasi, and Kruse (2010) examine these criticisms empirically 
and find that workers who received shared capitalism are more likely to 
engage in co-monitoring of employees, which potentially mitigates free 
riding. They also found that most employees in companies with shared 
capitalism have not taken on undue financial risk by excessively invest-
ing in company stock, and that shared capitalism can provide a financial 
asset that is part of a diversification strategy of the type advised by port-
folio theory in economics if the level of stock funded by worker savings is 
kept within reasonable parameters. These empirical studies by Freeman, 
Blasi, and Kruse were the first to engage directly with the common 
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criticisms of employee ownership, and additional work needs to be done 
to help us better understand the potential negative consequences of 
shared capitalism and the conditions under which these negative conse-
quences are more likely to occur. 
These gaps are just a few of the most obvious ones among many in the 
current literature. We could also benefit, for example, from studies that 
use a pre- and post-implementation design to more robustiy analyze the 
impact of shared capitalism on the individual and organizational outcomes 
already discussed. Another important phenomenon relates to what hap-
pens when firms with significant employee ownership become publicly 
traded. Do the demands of a broader and more diverse group of outside 
shareholders, often focused on short-term profits, put employee owner-
ship at risk? In addition, we need more research on newer forms of shared 
capitalism, such as BBSOPs and ESPPs. Despite a dramatic growth in 
the number of these plans in the 1990s, there remains a lack of schol-
arly understanding on their diffusion, characteristics, and consequences. 
Moreover, we know next to nothing about how the recurring scandals and 
crises in the last ten years have influenced the use of BBSOPs. We know 
that stock option and similar types of plans have continued for executives, 
but have firms scaled back on these new forms of shared capitalism under 
economic strain? In a related vein, what is the continuing role of BBSOPs 
among knowledge-based firms? A number of scholars have suggested that 
egalitarian organizational cultures and broad-based stock options were key 
to the development and success of the high-tech sector (Saxenian 1996; 
Blasi, Kruse, and Bernstein 2003). However, were BBSOPs only a conve-
nient form of compensation in a booming economy or are they integral to 
the long-term success of these firms? Finally, although shared capitalism is 
a global phenomenon, we still need to better integrate lessons from cross-
national experiences. Advancing research on all of these fronts would 
deepen our understanding of shared capitalism and the conditions under 
which it works best. 
The Chapters in This Book 
The chapters in this volume help address some of these gaps while 
illuminating others. The book is organized into three broad sections. 
Section I addresses the relationship between shared capitalism and 
organized labor, a topic likely to be of key interest to readers of this 
volume. Unions have historically been skeptical of employee owner-
ship, seeing it as a way for management to co-opt employees and 
prevent the formation of unions, or to diminish the power of existing 
ones. However, since a wave of union-led employee buyouts of firms 
in old-line manufacturing industries such as steel in the 1980s, unions 
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have maintained a less ambivalent stance toward employee ownership, 
preferring to evaluate it on a case-by-case basis. The three chapters in 
this first section explore the relationship between organized labor and 
shared capitalism in more depth. 
In Chapter 2, McCarthy, Voos, Eaton, Kruse, and Blasi first provide 
an enlightening examination of the historical context of both unions 
and employee ownership and the existing literature on the two, high-
lighting that "unions have a mixed relationship—both ideologically and 
pragmatically—with shared capitalism." To examine this relationship in 
more depth, the authors analyze a unique cross-sectional sample of over 
17,000 employees in 11 companies with shared capitalism, finding that 
the relationship between the two "appears to be complementary rather 
than oppositional." 
In the next chapter, Berry and Schneider provide further support 
for a complementary relationship through their in-depth case study of 
Cooperative Home Care Associates (CHCA), a worker cooperative that 
is unionized by the Service Employees International Union (SEIU). This 
chapter demonstrates that, in situations where employee owners have a 
direct role in governance, unions still have opportunities to improve the 
quality of jobs and help employees develop leadership skills. Their analy-
sis also highlights the importance of understanding the motivations for 
employee-owned firms in unionizing for the development of an effective 
relationship between labor and management, as well as the importance 
of formal structures that facilitate collaboration among executives, 
employee owners, and union representatives. 
In Chapter 4, Bova approaches the union-shared capitalism rela-
tionship from a very different perspective, namely that of accounting 
and finance, examining the unintentional benefits of shared capitalism 
in unionized settings. Drawing upon a large sample of publicly traded 
ESOP companies, Bova reveals that shared capitalism can lead to better 
financial transparency in unionized settings by reducing the incentive 
for corporate managers to keep their books opaque. Employee owner-
ship, therefore, may lead to positive outcomes for shareholders through 
this mechanism. This chapter is representative of an emergent literature 
within accounting and finance analyzing shared capitalism. 
Section II provides a snapshot of the broad diversity of current 
research on shared capitalism in terms of topics, theoretical approaches, 
and research methods. In Chapter 5, Meyers examines the potential of 
shared capitalism to empower working-class employees, which has been 
one of the key ideological rationales for shared capitalism. Despite the 
centrality of the empowerment of employees in the discourse surround-
ing employee ownership, academic studies on this topic have been 
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remarkably lacking. Through ethnographic and archival methods, 
Meyers examines working-class empowerment in two worker coopera-
tives. Her analysis demonstrates that employee ownership has the poten-
tial to empower working-class employees, but that empowerment is not 
an automatic consequence of shared capitalism, even in cooperatives 
(the form of shared capitalism that is the most egalitarian in terms of 
how ownership is shared and the most far-reaching in terms of provid-
ing employees with a role in governance). Meyers's chapter shows that 
empowerment only emerges in conjunction with formal, but nonhierar-
chical, organizational structures, and, since class always intersects with 
gender and race, with organizational narratives that recognize how gen-
der and race interact with class in the workplace. Surprisingly, Meyers's 
chapter represents one of the few sociological studies of contemporary 
worker ownership—a gap that will hopefully be addressed in the near 
future, since sociology is distinctive in its recognition of the central role 
that power, social stratification, and gender and ethnoracial identities 
play in all social settings, especially organizations. This theoretical terrain 
has been relatively unexplored with respect to shared capitalism. 
In Chapter 6, Kurtulus, Kruse, and Blasi examine a very different 
set of worker outcomes relating to attitudes about compensation risk 
and how the match between an employee's view of risk and the riskiness 
of employee compensation packages influences standard psychological 
outcomes of workers. One of the primary criticisms of employee owner-
ship leveled by economists is that it creates too much risk for the average 
worker. The cross-sectional data set analyzed in this chapter provides 
a rare way to test contentions about risk and risk preferences and how 
they influence worker attitudes and behavior. The authors find that a 
match between compensation risk and risk preferences has a positive 
impact on a range of workplace attitudes and that risk-averse workers 
do not react negatively to shared capitalism. This chapter is the first aca-
demic study on the topic and also contributes to the broader literature 
on risk preferences and compensation in the HR literature. 
Section II concludes on a more theoretical note. In Chapter 7, 
Caramelli takes on a core topic within existing academic work on shared 
capitalism: the influence of shared capitalism on corporate performance. 
In assessing the vast literature, Caramelli observes that this work has 
been very thin on explaining exactly why there is a relationship between 
shared capitalism and firm performance. Taking a different approach 
from existing work, he employs an inductive, qualitative methodology 
in the context of France to illuminate several new mechanisms through 
which employee ownership affects performance. In the final chapter of 
Section II, Aldatmaz and Ouimet provide an exhaustive review of the 
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existing work on broad-based stock options in the economics and finance 
literature. Their careful and original synthesis of this growing body of 
work focuses on explanations for why firms adopt BBSOPs and the 
impact of BBSOPs on firm performance. The emergence of BBSOPs 
in the 1990s represents the latest development of a new form of shared 
capitalism, and our academic understanding of the contours and implica-
tions of this form remains very underdeveloped. This chapter provides a 
timely and important contribution to our knowledge. 
The last section includes three chapters that each examine the broad 
experience of employee ownership in a specific geographic context. 
Such analyses, by linking the experience of shared capitalism to specific 
institutional, economic, and cultural environments, provide a unique 
perspective that is representative of a range of cross-national work (see 
Poutsma, de Nijs, and Poole 2003). In Chapter 9, Arando, Freundlich, 
Gago, Jones, and Kato provide a broad assessment of one of the most 
well-known examples of shared capitalism—the network of cooperative 
firms in the Mondragon region of Northern Spain. Using a unique set 
of new data collected from the cooperatives and archival sources, this 
chapter analyzes the reasons why the group of Mondragon coopera-
tives has survived and grown in the face of globalization and recurring 
financial crises while maintaining its original ideals of workplace democ-
racy. Although these ideals have been compromised to some extent, the 
authors attribute the overall success of this network of firms to its insti-
tutional flexibility and innovation. 
In Chapter 10, Logue and Yates assess the experience of ESOP firms 
in Ohio over a 21-year period. Drawing on a unique longitudinal data set 
of a representative sample of ESOP firms in Ohio, a type of data set that 
is rare, the authors examine the development of ESOP companies over 
time and the characteristics associated with ESOPs that endure for long 
periods. The authors find that ESOP firms that survive the longest are 
more committed to creating significant employee involvement in man-
agement and are more fiscally cautious and willing to make sacrifices. 
Long-lived ESOPs also experienced significant growth in the number of 
participants and had an increase in better-paying jobs with good benefits. 
In the final chapter, Pendleton examines the experience of shared 
capitalism in the United Kingdom over the last two decades. The United 
Kingdom, along with the United States, has been one of the pioneers of 
laws to promote shared capitalism. Taking a broad, historical approach 
using archival data, Pendleton not only provides an elegant and engaging 
descriptive analysis of different types of shared capitalism in the United 
Kingdom, but he also makes an important theoretical contribution by 
emphasizing the necessity for researchers to pay careful attention to the 
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different types of ownership. This insight is applicable to shared capital-
ism in any national context. In assessing the determinants of adoption of 
shared capitalism, Pendleton finds that different theoretical perspectives 
are salient for explaining the diffusion of different forms of it. 
Taken together, the ten chapters in this book provide a sample of the 
diverse currents of contemporary academic research on shared capital-
ism. While they of course leave many questions unanswered and raise 
many new ones, they each address important and enduring gaps in our 
understanding of the experience of shared capitalism, offer innovative 
research designs and theoretical contributions, and open up many new 
lines of inquiry for additional research. 
Promoting Shared Capitalism Through Public Policy 
While the primary goal of this volume is to highlight current research 
on shared capitalism, the academic literature offers a number of implica-
tions for public policy, and I end this introduction with a deeper discus-
sion of these implications. The consistency in the findings regarding the 
positive effects that shared capitalism can have on employee and firm 
outcomes should be more than sufficient evidence for the desirability of 
policies to encourage more companies to not only adopt such plans, but 
to do so in combination with other human resource practices, particu-
larly broad-based employee participation in decision making. Moreover, 
it is likely that the positive effects on employee well-being, corporate 
performance, and organizational stability may also have broader eco-
nomic and social consequences. For example, better-performing firms 
that are more likely to survive in the long term are the ones best posi-
tioned to foster sustained economic growth and employment stability. In 
addition, by more broadly distributing the financial gains of production 
of all lands and supplementing wages that continue to stagnate for most 
occupations, shared capitalism might also help mitigate the alarming 
expansion of income and wealth inequality that has occurred over the 
last two decades in the United States. In fact, a key driver in this expan-
sion of inequality has been the broad diffusion of shared capitalism for 
the upper echelon of top managers in publicly traded firms (Morgan and 
Cha 2007; DiPrete, Eirich, and Pittinsky 2010). These employees have 
benefited handsomely from having stock options and restricted stock 
units. More broadly distributing the opportunity of stock ownership to 
most or all employees would help reconnect the link between productiv-
ity improvements and the income of all employees—a link that prior to 
the 1980s was made through gradual increases in wages but has since 
been severed. In addition, shared capitalism, by putting more income 
into the hands of more people and dispersing purchasing power more 
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broadly, could help promote economic growth and create a robust foun-
dation of economic activity to spur new investment. Finally, by creating 
incentives for corporate managers to create more participative work-
places (since the research is clear that this is when shared capitalism has 
the most potential), policies to promote shared capitalism could help fos-
ter the development of organizational structures that allow more people 
to have input into decisions relating to economic production, invest-
ment, and distribution—a breadth of participation that is notably absent 
in the current shareholder value model, which is based on the concen-
tration of rewards and decision making into a small group of people. 
Although research on the broader social and economic effects of 
shared capitalism remains at a very early stage, such consequences do 
not seem far-fetched or fantastical. When viewed together with the per-
suasive academic evidence about the positive effects of shared capitalism 
on individual and organizational outcomes, a compelling case for policy 
initiatives to promote the adoption of shared capitalism by more compa-
nies emerges. Certainly, it is an unusual type of policy issue that could 
(and has) gained support from a broad range of the political spectrum, 
from those on the right, such as Ronald Reagan and Representative 
Dana Rohrabacher (R-Calif), who see it as creating a population of capi-
talists, to those on the left who see it as a way to promote more demo-
cratic workplaces. A number of academics and practitioners have offered 
suggestions for policies to promote shared capitalism. In the rest of this 
section, I review these and offer a few new suggestions. 
The most obvious type of policy would be to provide corporations 
with tax incentives to implement shared capitalism and to ensure that 
these plans are structured in ways that benefit most or all employees, 
not just a select few. Current laws on ESOPs provide an instructive and 
useful model. Firms that establish ESOPs can deduct from their taxable 
income contributions to the ESOP (up to 15% of payroll if the plan does 
not borrow money and up to 25% of payroll if a plan is leveraged). In 
addition, owners who sell to an ESOP can defer capital gains taxes on 
all proceeds from the sale, provided that the ESOP owns at least 30% 
of the firm's shares after the sale. However, ESOPs must meet specific 
conditions regarding participation (typically all full-time employees who 
have been with the company at least one year) and allocation (highly 
compensated employees cannot receive a disproportionately large per-
centage of stock). The ESOP laws provide a model for promoting the 
adoption of other types of plans, such as stock options, through similar 
policies. Three of the most prominent academics studying shared capi-
talism (Freeman, Blasi, and Kruse), in conjunction with the Center for 
American Progress, a major policy think tank in Washington, DC, have 
developed more specific 
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